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ABSTRACT: Robert Fogelin (1985) formulated the thesis “that deep disagreements cannot be resolved 
through the use of argument, for they undercut the conditions essential to arguing.” The possibility of 
arguing presupposes “a shared background of beliefs and preferences,” and if such a background is not 
given, there is no way of “rational” dispute resolution. By contrast to this pessimistic view, I will propose a 
method that has been developed to overcome difficulties as described by Fogelin. 
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More than twenty years ago, Robert Fogelin proposed a distinction between “normal” 
argumentative exchange and “deep disagreements” (Fogelin, 1985). “Normal” is the 
process of arguing, or giving reasons, when we can explain something to somebody else 
“within a context of broadly shared beliefs and preferences” (p. 3). If I ask Fogelin why 
he takes a certain route and he responds, “I want to pick up the fish last,” there is no need 
for further reasons. Within our “shared background of beliefs and preferences” (p. 5) it is 
absolutely clear that we prefer fresh fish over stinking fish. A normal argument is 
possible, says Fogelin, if  
 
the parties to the conversation share a great many beliefs and (if this is different) a great many 
preferences. … An important feature of these shared beliefs and preferences is that they lie in the 
background, unmentioned. They guide the discussion, but they are not the subject of it. (Except 
occasionally: “you don’t want rotten fish, do you?”) They provide the framework or the structure 
within which reasons can be marshaled, where marshaling reasons is typically a matter of citing 
facts in a way that their significance becomes clear. This is a high level enterprise, one that rests 
upon the thick sedimentary layer of the unchallenged. (p. 3; his emphasis). 
 
The possibility of normal argumentative exchange as based on a shared background of 
beliefs and preferences implies—for Fogelin—the impossibility of such an exchange in 
cases of “deep disagreement.” Although the “language of argument may persist” in such 
a case, the argument itself “becomes pointless since it makes an appeal to something that 
does not exist: a shared background of beliefs and preferences” (p. 5). When we are 
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facing disputes over the morality of abortion, or affirmative action quota, we know that 
even people with the best intentions and the ability to listen will not change their mind by 
any appeal to reasons or facts. What Fogelin calls “deep disagreements” are those cases 
that are generated by conflicts between fundamental “framework propositions” (p. 5). 
Although a rational approach would try “to surface these background propositions and 
then discuss them directly,” experience shows that the main problem is that “we do not 
simply find isolated propositions” as the source of deep disagreements, “but instead a 
whole system of mutually supporting propositions (and paradigms, models, styles of 
acting and thinking) that constitute, if I may use the phrase, a form of life” (pp. 5-6). 
Since any argument must refer to a shared framework of background assumptions, “deep 
disagreements cannot be resolved through the use of argument, for they undercut the 
conditions essential to arguing” (p. 5). Although not every disagreement is deep, and 
although even “with deep disagreements, people can argue well or badly,” so that 
teaching argumentation still makes sense, in the end, Fogelin concludes, “we should tell 
the truth: there are disagreements, sometimes on important issues, which by their nature, 
are not subject to rational resolution” (p. 7). 
 At this point, however, I guess I am in deep disagreement with Fogelin. Of 
course, everybody knows what it means to have one of these futile controversies with 
people who we try to avoid anyway. There is indeed enough evidence that not every 
conflict can be resolved by “good” arguments. But does this necessarily imply that we 
should keep our brains away from those issues? Is it really a defendable approach “to fall 
back on persuasion,” as Fogelin suggests (p. 7), when things get unpleasant? It is not only 
that it seems to be a waste of time to study and to teach informal logic if the only 
reasonable application is to explain to my buddy the relationship between fish and 
travelling the suburbs; more important is the fact that people do not only fall back on 
persuasion when they find themselves in deep disagreements—they also kill each other. 
Deep disagreements do not only have a cognitive basis—incompatible systems of beliefs 
and preferences—they are often also based on real needs and interests, and that means: 
they tend to escalate. 
 Given the fact that some deep disagreements lead to violent clashes over decades, 
we should try harder to make our specific competencies as argumentation theorists 
relevant for the real problems we are facing day after day. Simply closing our eyes, or 
looking elsewhere, should be regarded as academic cynicism if we can do better. 
 From my point of view, I see two fundamental problems with Fogelin’s 
considerations. The first one concerns his starting point, the distinction between “normal” 
argumentative exchange and “deep disagreements.” As presented, this distinction is 
basically an ontological distinction—disagreements are distinguishable “by their nature,” 
as he says (p. 7); Fogelin presupposes that ‘there are’ these two forms of human 
interaction and communication, and that it is possible to distinguish them by analyzing 
stakeholders’ underlying systems of beliefs and preferences. However, as we know at 
least since Kant, it would be naïve to assume that we can formulate an ontology without 
an epistemological reflection: How can it be possible to decide whether two belief 
systems are compatible or not? Already our everyday experience shows that there is 
virtually no situation imaginable in which there is not at least some common ground. 
There is no language on Earth that is absolutely beyond translatability, and even in the 
most violent conflicts people can refer at least to some common experiences. Instead of 
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assuming an a priori distinction between compatible and incompatible belief systems: 
Why do we not simply try to figure out, first of all, how deep disagreements really are in 
concrete cases? The process of argumentation itself—simply doing it—sometimes reveals 
possible ways out of conflicts. 
 The second problem is more hidden in Fogelin’s approach. There seems to be the 
expectation that a well formulated argumentation could per se provide a “rational 
resolution” of disagreements (p. 7). Although he is criticizing works in informal logic that 
“give the impression that they possess the resources to resolve” deep disagreements (p. 
6), he seems to share with these works the assumption that the point of informal logic is 
indeed to “possess” resources that can be used to resolve something. I am not sure 
whether Fogelin actually would defend the position that tools provided by argumentation 
theory and informal logic can be applied ‘objectively’—that is, based on standards whose 
meaning does not depend on its respective interpretation in a certain situation; but if he 
does so, I would respond with the thesis that although there are obviously standards of 
what a good argument is, and how it should be developed, there are no standards—
besides the formal standards of logical validity—that could not be interpreted differently, 
but still reasonably. As I argued elsewhere (Hoffmann, 2005b), there are no non-relative 
criteria for argument evaluation, and that would imply that there is no development of an 
argument that could avoid any subjective, social, or conceptual influence. How we 
develop and evaluate an argument depends exactly on the same systems of beliefs, 
preferences, values, and attitudes whose significance Fogelin demonstrated so 
convincingly (cf. Feldman, 1994). 
 Based on both these problems—the ontological assumption of a clear-cut 
distinction between deep and not deep disagreements and the assumed objectivity of 
“rational” argumentation—I am inclined to follow a more pragmatic approach to the 
problem of deep disagreements. By “pragmatic” I do not only refer to Charles S. Peirce’s 
idea—as formulated in his “pragmatic maxim” (Peirce, CP 5.9; 5.438) and in his 
semiotics (CP 2.228; 5.473; 5.475)—that there is no meaning without interpretation, but 
also to what he developed under the heading of “diagrammatic reasoning”: that there is 
no development of knowledge without doing something (CP 4.233; Hoffmann, 2004, 
2005a, submitted). The method of argumentation that I will propose in this paper—
Logical Argument Mapping (cf. Hoffmann, 2005c, 2007)—does not attempt to resolve a 
well-defined set of disagreements in a mechanical way; its basic pragmatic idea is rather 
to stimulate thinking processes, and to challenge people involved in disputes to change 
their mind. There is of course no guarantee that this will work in concrete situations; but 
this pragmatic approach provides at least something that can be offered even in cases that 
seem to be hopeless. Logical Argument Mapping (LAM) intends to move things forward. 
It is designed to figure out, first of all, whether there is any common ground among 
parties to a conflict, and to challenge people to reflect critically on their own thinking, not 
that of their opponents. 
 To demonstrate what I mean by trying to resolve disagreements by means of 
Logical Argument Mapping, I will reconstruct in this paper two conflicting arguments on 
Hamas, the Palestinian organization that won the election on January 25 in 2006, and that 
is listed by the United States to this date as a terrorist group. One of these arguments has 
been published by an Israeli General, the other by a London based Palestinian scholar. 
Obviously, it was not hard to find what Fogelin called “deep disagreements.” 
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Nevertheless, by translating both texts into the language of LAM some interesting new 
horizons become visible.  
 Before that, however, I have to elaborate some more general epistemological 
considerations that are important to understand the rationale behind LAM. These 
considerations can be linked to Fogelin’s “systems of beliefs and preferences,” but they 
differentiate those more precisely.  
 
2. BOUNDARY JUDGMENTS, FRAMING, AND SENSEMAKING 
 
The basic epistemological assumption I am starting from is that all our understanding of 
something is co-determined by our cognitive abilities. As I said earlier, there is no 
ontology without an epistemology. Whatever exists, our access to it is constrained and 
conditioned by conceptual frameworks, theories, beliefs, values, attitudes, models, 
images, and narratives that are mainly part of our cultural and social heritage (Hanson, 
1972 <1958>). There may be something like Heidegger’s immediate “being-in-the-
world” (Dasein), but in the very moment we try to cope with the problems of this world, 
or when we are referring to this world in social interaction and communication, or when 
we only think about it, we are dependent on what can be described in a most general way 
as the representational means—which are at the same time epistemological, or cognitive 
means (cf. Hoffmann & Roth, 2007)—that are available to us in this very situation. 
 If there is indeed a fundamental “gap between what exists and the languages, both 
natural and artificial, for talking and reasoning about what exists”—a gap whose bridging 
John Sowa (2001) describes as the central problem of ontology—and if everything can 
principally be represented in an infinite number of different ways, then the central 
problem of epistemology is to answer the question what an adequate representation is. 
Since the world we are trying to represent seems to be more or less in flux, and since it is 
full of complexity, interdependencies, and without clear boundaries and structure, any 
representation is inevitably a reduction and simplification. 
 Fogelin’s discussion of a “whole system of mutually supporting propositions (and 
paradigms, models, styles of acting and thinking) that constitute … a form of life” (pp. 5-
6) provides a nice description of how those reductions and simplifications work. But 
these holistic life forms are not only relevant for people in disagreements; rather, they 
form the framework of conditions on which any knowledge, and any understanding 
whatsoever, depends. The point is only that usually there is not much of a need to reflect 
on this fact. As Habermas pointed out, mutual understanding is possible only within a 
jointly shared “lifeworld” (Lebenswelt). For him, our lifeworld is a set of culturally given, 
unquestioned, and only implicitly known background assumptions, social practices, and 
individual skills (Habermas, 1984, 1987 <1981>, vol. I, pp. 335-338, vol. II, pp. 124-
142). We can say a person’s “lifeworld” is the complete set of experiences—in thinking 
and acting—that is available for this person at a certain time. However, since we are 
normally living with others in more or less shared lifeworlds, the lifeworld dependency of 
understanding remains mostly invisible and unquestioned. Only in conflicts—and this is a 
point on which Logical Argument Mapping focuses—a reflection on those hidden 
conditions of understanding might be necessary and useful. 
 In order to understand more precisely how all these conditions of understanding 
influence our thinking and acting in cases of disagreement, I would like to distinguish 
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three different, but closely connected, mechanisms: “boundary setting,” “framing,” and 
“sensemaking.” “Boundary setting” becomes visible in what C. West Churchman (1979) 
called “boundary judgments.” A discussion of this concept played recently a significant 
role in so-called “critical systems thinking” in management and organization theory 
(Flood, 1999; Ulrich, 2001, 2003). “Framing” is a well-known concept in conflict 
research and communication theory, and “sensemaking” is a term I would use to describe 
the cognitive side of both “boundary judgments” and “framing.” 
 Let’s start with “boundary setting.” Robert Louis Flood describes Churchman’s 
ideas as follows: 
 
Churchman recognized in his critical systemic thinking that the human mind is not able to know 
the whole. ... Yet the human mind, for Churchman, may appreciate the essential quality of the 
whole. For Churchman, appreciation of this essential quality begins … when first you see the 
world through the eyes of another. The systems approach, he says, then goes on to discover that 
every worldview is terribly restricted. Consequently, with Churchman, a rather different kind of 
question about practice surfaces. ... That is, who is to judge that any one bounded appreciation is 
most relevant or acceptable? Each judgment is based on a rationality of its own that chooses 
where a boundary is to be drawn, which issues and dilemmas thus get on the agenda, and who will 
benefit from this. For each choice it is necessary to ask, What are the consequences to be expected 
insofar as we can evaluate them and, on reflection, how do we feel about that? As Churchman 
points out, each judgment of this sort is of an ethical nature since it cannot escape the choice of 
who is to be the client—the beneficiary—and thus which issues and dilemmas will be central to 
debate and future action. In this way, the spirit of C. West Churchman becomes our moral 
conscience. A key principle of systemic thinking, according to Churchman, is to remain ethically 
alert. Boundary judgments facilitate a debate in which we are sensitized to ethical issues and 
dilemmas. (Flood, 1999, pp. 252-253) 
 
A boundary judgment is a choice that determines who is to be in the bounded action area and will 
benefit and who is to be out and will not benefit. For this reason, Churchman (1979), in his book 
The Systems Approach and Its Enemies, stressed the importance of critique. Critique helps us to 
become more aware of the boundaries within which we live and operate. Critique in everyday 
situations involves listening to and responding to the viewpoints of one’s worst enemies in reason. 
Enemies, Churchman points out, are, in a sense and quite ironically, our best friends—it is they 
who are most likely to help their intellectual adversaries to see the partiality and irrationality of 
their favored boundary judgment and possible consequences relating to this. (Flood, 1999, p. 255) 
 
Setting boundaries is at the same time a necessity in the face of overwhelming 
complexity, and a dangerous limitation for our thinking and acting. Boundary judgments 
define what is within our horizon of awareness and what is outside. As Werner Ulrich 
puts it: 
 
No argument can be completely rational in the sense of justifying all the assumptions on which it 
depends as well as all the consequences it may have. What ought to count as knowledge, that is, as 
relevant circumstances, ‘facts’ and ‘evidence’ that should be considered? And what counts as 
relevant concerns, that is, value judgments concerning purposes, measures of success and other 
criteria of evaluation (‘norms’)? Whose facts and whose concerns should they represent? 
Ultimately, there is no single right way to decide such questions. Yet at some point argumentation 
has to end and practical action has to begin. Boundary judgments define the boundaries of 
argumentation. (Ulrich, 2001, p. 91) 
 
While Churchman emphasized the necessity to have an “enemy” to overcome the 
unavoidable limitations of boundary judgments, Ulrich seems to assume that what he 
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calls “boundary critique” can be done by everyone and should accompany all our efforts. 
According to Ulrich, boundary critique 
 
• analyzes how any claim about facts or values is conditioned by boundary 
judgments 
• shows how facts and values change when boundary judgments are modified 
• assumes that observations, evaluations, and boundary judgments form an 
interdependent system of selectivity 
• analyzes the practical implications of selectivity: how it may affect all the parties 
concerned (Ulrich, 2003, p. 333-334) 
 
However, in so far as boundary judgments are implicit and based on unconscious 
processes, it seems to be inevitable that any attempt to “critique” boundary judgments is 
itself determined by the same mechanisms it analyzes. There is no way to look at systems 
of selectivity from the outside. 
 While the concept of boundary judgments allows us to reflect on mechanisms of 
inclusion and exclusion—regarding issues, facts, values, norms, concerns, involved 
people, etc.—the concept of “framing” provides a means to reflect on the fact that 
everything that is within the boundaries of our awareness can itself be interpreted by 
completely different reference systems. Gregory Bateson (1972 <1955>) introduced the 
example of two monkeys he observed in the zoo biting each other. Although this biting 
was similar to what can be observed in real fights, it was obvious to him that what was 
happening was only play. He concluded that even animals are able to engage in what he 
called “meta-communication.” They exchange signs that allow them to distinguish 
whether a biting has to be framed as play or as serious fight (179).  
 Similarly, Sanda Kaufman, Michael Elliott, and Deborah Shmueli showed by 
contrasting a statement by civil rights leader Martin Luther King, Jr., and another one by 
president Lyndon B. Johnson how a riot can be framed completely differently: “A riot is 
at bottom the language of the unheard” said King, while Johnson claimed: “[Rioters] are 
lawbreakers, destroyers of constitutional rights and liberties and ultimately destroyers of 
a free America” (Kaufman et al., 2003). While in these examples the framing process is 
explicit and obvious, we can imagine situations that are harder to interpret; for example 
when the play of children suddenly turns into fight. However, in both cases it is 
absolutely clear that we can observe framing processes only if people who frame 
something produce certain signs that indicate how they interpret this issue, and how they 
want others to interpret this issue. Based on this consideration, I would define “framing” 
as follows. 
  
 Definition of “framing”: 
Framing is the process of producing signs in a way that the entirety of those signs 
indicate a reference systems that determines the way the framer interprets 
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This definition builds on a similar definition proposed by Barbara Gray: 
 
Framing refers to the process of constructing and representing our interpretations of the world 
around us. We construct frames by sorting and categorizing our experience—weighing new 
information against our previous interpretations. (Gray, 2003, p. 12; cf. Kaufman et al., 2003: 
“framing refers to the creation of frames”). 
 
What I am trying to emphasize in contrast to Gray’s definition is that identifying and 
analyzing framing processes from an observer’s point of view depends heavily on 
hypotheses and guesses. We can neither see the “interpretations” nor the “frames” Gray 
talks about; the only thing we can see is what we interpret as signs for a certain way of 
“sorting and categorizing” experiences. The “entirety” of signs I am referring to is, of 
course, always relative to our capacities—and time—to observe those signs. And while 
the function of the “reference system” in my definition should be clear—the term 
replaces what others call “frames”—those systems can only be indicated by the signs we 
observe. 
 Kaufman et al. (2003) emphasize that “framing” can either be an unconscious 
process or “a deliberative, analytic, or strategic process.” The latter is important for 
conflict management. Thus, Gray (2006) argues for framing as a “mediation technique. ... 
The mediator’s role is to help frame the conflict and its potential resolution in a way that 
all parties perceive to be fair” (cf. Drake & Donohue, 1996, p. 314; Dewulf et al., 2005, 
p. 3).  
 While my definition of “framing” stresses the expressive side of what happens in 
communication and interaction, there is of course also an underlying cognitive side. To 
distinguish both more precisely, I would use the term “sensemaking” that can be defined 
as follows: 
 
Definition of “sensemaking” and further involved concepts: 
Sensemaking is the process of interpreting data in a way that they fit into a belief-
value-attitude system. “Data” can be externally observable signs, people, things, 
events, etc., but also ideas or thoughts. A “belief-value-attitude system” is a 
network of beliefs, values, and attitudes that is consistent from its bearer’s point 
of view. A “belief” is defined here as that cognitive state we are in whenever we 
take something to be the case or regard it as true, implicitly or explicitly; thus, a 
belief is representable in the form of a factual or conditional statement. “Values” 
are defined as behavior guiding beliefs that are based on principles, needs, 
interests, or preferences. “Attitudes” are emotions someone feels with regard to 
certain data. The “fit” of data into a belief-value-attitude system can be achieved 
in three different ways: (a) by constraining the data (neglecting what is 
incomprehensible, or what does not fit); (b) by changing the system; or (c) by a 
mixture of (a) and (b). 
 
My emphasis of the fact that sensemaking might include to “neglect” certain data 
indicates that this cognitive process is not only basic for framing processes, but also for 
boundary setting as discussed above. How we include and exclude certain issues, facts, 
values, norms, concerns, involved people, and so on, can be explained by reference to 
two elements of this definition of sensemaking: first, that whatever we observe or 
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communicate always gets to be interpreted by means of a certain belief-value-attitude 
system and, second, that the process of interpreting and integrating data is driven by 
efforts to keep the whole thing consistent—or at least to avoid obvious contradictions. 
 
3. THE PROBLEM 
 
Based on these epistemological considerations we can now refine the problem that 
Fogelin described under the heading of “deep disagreements.” So far, I argued for the 
following points: 
 
• Not only positions to controversial issues like abortion are embedded in people’s 
belief-value-attitude systems, but any perception or interpretation of something is 
the result of sensemaking, that is of a process of integrating data into a given 
belief-value-attitude system. 
• The inevitable limitations of any given belief-value-attitude system determine, on 
the one hand, how people set boundaries between those issues, facts, values, 
persons, etc., they care about and those beyond their horizon of awareness; and 
they determine, on the other hand, how they frame the issues they care about. 
• Since we can never know a priori whether the belief-value-attitudes systems of 
different people can form a “shared” background, there is need for a pragmatic 
approach that replaces attempts to describe and to analyze situations of 
disagreement by thinking about methods of how people in disagreement can 
figure out for themselves whether there is any common ground they can build on. 
 
The last of these points is the central motivation behind the development of Logical 
Argument Mapping as a tool for conflict management (Hoffmann, 2005c). Before I show 
how it is supposed to work, let me emphasize what I consider, based on these 
considerations, to be the central problem of disagreements and conflicts. The problem is: 
If I am right concerning the principal limitations of perceiving and interpreting 
something, then we have to realize that the same is true also for our own perceptions and 
interpretations. That means, however, there can never be a ‘neutral,’ or unbiased, 
observer’s point of view. Even if we are not personally involved in the conflicts we are 
analyzing, whatever we are doing is constrained, at some point, in exactly the same way 
by limitations of boundary setting, framing, and sensemaking as the processes we are 
analyzing. 
 
4. LOGICAL ARGUMENT MAPPING (LAM) 
 
The basic idea of Logical Argument Mapping (LAM) is to provide a tool to visualize, in a 
step-by-step process, those elements of belief-value-attitude systems that determine 
boundary setting, framing, and sensemaking with regard to a certain issue. Through 
representing what we think about an issue by means of argument maps, we are challenged 
to reflect on the limitations of our belief-value-attitude systems. The goal is that people, 
motivated by those reflection, develop those systems and change their mind. Not only our 
enemies may be our best friends, as Churchman said (Flood, 1999, p. 255), but any 
representation of our thinking can be such a ‘good friend’ since it forces us to reflect on 
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the boundaries or our thinking and how we frame things. More specific, LAM is 
supposed to fulfill the following heuristic and social functions: 
 
Heuristic functions:  
• visualizing belief-value-attitude systems as far as they are relevant for boundary 
setting, framing, and sensemaking in a certain situation, or with regard to a certain 
issue 
• clarifying vague thinking and implicit assumptions 
• stimulating creativity, the discovery of alternative perspectives, and 
experimenting with representations 
• visualizing implications and problems of our assumptions and possible 
contradictions among them 
• challenging critical thinking and self-reflexivity 
 
Social functions:  
• coordinating different problem representations with its boundary judgments and 
framing processes 
• stimulating negotiation of meanings and argumentation 
• connecting expertise 
• promoting mutual understanding by visualizing implicit assumptions, framing 
processes, and boundary constraints 
 
The method itself is hardly new. It uses logically valid argument forms that are well-
known for millennia, and it builds on the terminology and representational means that 
have been developed by Stephen Toulmin (2003 <1958>) and other more application-
oriented approaches to logic (cf. Luckhardt & Bechtel, 1994). Another point of reference 
are recent reflections on, and developments of, Computer-Supported Argument 
Visualization (CSAV; cf. Kirschner et al., 2003). New is only the combination of these 
approaches with philosophical considerations that focus, on the one hand, on the heuristic 
power of working with representations—as developed by Peirce with regard to his 
concept of “diagrammatic reasoning” (Hoffmann, submitted)—and, on the other hand, on 
the Russian psychologist Lev S. Vygotsky’s idea of “semiotic mediation.” For Vygotsky, 
the main function of signs is to regulate both social interaction and our own thinking 
(Seeger, 2005). 
 The general idea of Logical Argument Mapping is simple: to challenge people to 
provide reasons for their claims. Since this has to be done by means of a graphical 
representation system—either on a piece of paper or on a computer screen, but according 
to certain rules and conventions—people get involved in a very concrete activity. Instead 
of talking always along the same, stereotyped lines they are forced, first of all, to slow 
down. And they are forced to be explicit: to explicate what they think.  
 As my distinction between heuristic and social functions indicates, LAM can be 
used for different purposes in a variety of contexts. The heuristic potential comes already 
to light when we analyze for ourselves a text by means of LAM (links to some examples 
on the web can be found in Hoffmann, 2007). This way we can easily see how an author 
draws the boundaries around a certain issue or problem, and we can identify—at least 
partially—the reference system that determines how she frames her point. Even more 
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important is the fact that we can control the consistency and completeness of 
argumentations when everything that an author takes into account—and, additionally, 
what she or he assumes implicitly—becomes visible on a map. LAM does not only allow 
us to represent all the elements that are within the boundaries of someone’s awareness, 
but also all relations among those elements.  
 All this becomes even more important when LAM is used in social settings, 
because the participants of collaborative Logical Argument Mapping can challenge each 
other to reveal how they set boundaries and frame an issue. This opens up possibilities of 
critique, self-reflectivity, and a development of those belief-value-attitude systems that 
form the roots of disagreements. LAM is designed as a tool to facilitate collaboration and 
communication. The goal is not to produce an ‘objective’ representation of a 
controversial issue, or the problem in question, but to initiate a debate and a collaborative 
problem solving process.  
 The crucial point that is supposed to make all this happen is that LAM does not 
stop with providing reasons for a claim. We all know that any argument of the form “A, 
therefore B” can be turned into a logical argument—that is, a deductively valid 
argument—simply by adding the conditional statement “If A, then B” as a further 
premise. This way, we get the famous modus ponens form of arguments: 
 
 If A, then B 
 A 
 Therefore, B 
 
Fogelin (1985) argued emphatically against this kind of deductive reconstruction because 
“it yields,” as he says, “skeptical consequences”: 
 
The demand that in an acceptable argument the conclusion must be entailed by exceptionless 
premises yields the consequence that virtually all of those everyday arguments which seem 
perfectly adequate are, in fact, no good. In the short run, students find this discovery of almost 
universal irrationality arresting. Debunking has its charm. The long run effect is less salutary. If 
students become convinced that they can always find something wrong with any (non-trivial) 
argument presented to them, then the distinction between good arguments and bad arguments is 
subverted, and the whole enterprise of arguing seems to lose its point. (Fogelin, 1985, p. 2) 
 
Fogelin is right: the validity of the modus ponens depends on the “exceptionless” truth of 
the conditional statement “If A, then B.” This point has been stressed in particular by 
Toulmin (2003 <1958>) when he talked about the “warrants” in his famous model of 
argumentation. The conditional statement in the modus ponens argument fulfills the 
function of a “warrant” in Toulmin’s sense since it “authorizes” the step from the reason 
A to the claim B; “warrants” are “general, hypothetical statements, which can act as 
bridges” (p. 91). While the reason in an argument “expresses a piece of information from 
which we are drawing a conclusion,” a warrant is a “universal premiss” that 
 
expresses, not a piece of information at all, but a guarantee in accordance with which we can 
safely take the step from our datum to our conclusion. Such a guarantee, for all its backing, will be 
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Fogelin’s fear, however, that skepticism, relativism and irrationality would prevail when 
students suddenly realize that those warrants are often hard to defend—based on their 
immanent universality—is only threatening for an approach that is primarily concerned 
with objective criteria to distinguish ‘good’ and ‘bad’ arguments. I don’t think that the 
“point” of the “whole enterprise of arguing” is to make this distinction, as Fogelin claims. 
For the practice of argumentation—where the point is not the evaluation of argument 
quality from a kind of ‘God’s-eyes’ perspective, but the development of arguments—the 
vice becomes a virtue. Students—and anyone who argues—have to realize that the 
absolute power they often assume for their reasons does not come for free. It depends on 
assumptions of universality that must be made explicit to become an object of critical 
reflection, and to motivate a continuation of the process of argumentation.  
 Based on the fact that argumentation is primarily a social endeavour (Goldman, 
1999, p. 131), and a process of learning, we should simply forget the idea of being right 
or wrong, and we should focus instead on argumentation as an ongoing process of 
refining arguments within a setting of mutual critique. If a universal statement like “If A, 
then B” cannot be defended as universally true, then it might be better either to introduce 
one of Toulmin’s “qualifiers” such as “probably” and “presumably” (p. 93), or to look for 
better reasons, or to change the argument altogether. But before we can do this, we have 
to make explicit what we assume—at least implicitly—to be a “guarantee” for taking 
something as a “reason” for something else. 
 The crucial point of Logical Argument Mapping is the demand that any argument 
that plays a central role within an argumentation—and any argument whose validity 
someone doubts—has to be transformed into a logical argument by introducing a warrant 
that justifies taking a certain statement as a reason for a certain claim. Whether the 
argument becomes in this way a modus ponens argument, a modus tollens, an alternative 
or disjunctive syllogism, or whatever logically valid argument form, the essential point is 
to make the argument as strong as possible, and that means: to transform it into a logical 
argument. 
 Usually, this can be done more or less mechanically, as in our modus ponens 
argument above. If someone argues “It’s raining, therefore the crops on the field will get 
wet,” we can transform the whole argument into a logically valid form by adding the 
premise “If it is raining, then the crops on the field will get wet.” While this operation is 
absolutely trivial from a logical point of view, it has a very important practical 
implication. People who are challenged to complete their arguments in this way will 
suddenly see that the validity—and relevance—of their arguments always depends on 
two very different things: on the one hand, on the presupposed truth of the “pieces of 
information” they provide as reasons and, on the other, on the presupposed truth of a 
universal statement like “If A, then B.” Let’s take somebody who says “I have every right 
to destroy the infrastructure of your country since you started the aggressions.” In Logical 
Argument Mapping, this person would not only be challenged to defend the claim that the 
opponent started the aggressions, but also to state explicitly the general rule: “If 
somebody starts aggressions, the defender has every right to destroy this country’s 
infrastructure.” The point here is not so much that such a universal statement might be 
false; the point is that adding it to an argument map visualizes necessarily a part of the 
arguer’s belief-value-attitude system. For the fact that this person provides just this 
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reason is either absolutely arbitrary, or it is based on an implicit assumption like the one 
formulated above in form of a general rule.  
 The distinction between formulating reasons for a claim and formulating a general 
rule that justifies the relation between reason and claim is decisive in Logical Argument 
Mapping. While the claims and the reasons someone proposes during a process of 
argumentation show how this person draws the boundaries around the issue in question, 
visualizing the warrants that justify the relations between those reasons and claims 
reveals inevitably parts of those belief-value-attitude systems that underlie the involved 
processes of boundary setting, framing, and sensemaking. Visualizing those assumptions 
that may be only implicitly and unconsciously given is the first step to get access to them. 
And getting access to those patterns of thinking and feeling is a precondition to reflect on 
them, to criticize, and to defend them in an ongoing process of argumentation. 
 
5. AN EXAMPLE: TWO ARGUMENTS ON THE PALESTINIAN HAMAS 
 
Whether Logical Argument Mapping can indeed be a method to overcome the problems 
of “deep disagreements” described by Fogelin can only be tested in empirical studies. 
However, to demonstrate at least the principal ideas of LAM, and operations that could 
be performed by means of this tool, it should be sufficient in the context of this paper to 
propose a fictional process of Logical Argument Mapping. While I developed elsewhere 
an example that was constructed on the basis of a lot of singular pieces of information 
that came to light through various accounts of the failed Camp David negotiations 
between Israelis and Palestinians in 2000 (Hoffmann, 2005c), I am focusing here on two 
arguments that are available already in a well-articulated form; they are published in two 
scientific journals. Instead of using LAM as a tool in a real debate on a controversial 
issue, I will imagine a fictional argument mapping session in which, in a first step, each 
of the two participants develops his argument independently from possible objections of 
his opponent; in my fiction of this first step, I am using the two arguments as they are 
published, but shortened to what I consider their essential ideas. In a second fictional step 
the opponents would try to define the boundaries of their respective approaches by 
mapping the ideas, issues, and information they referred to in the first step in 
circumscribed areas of a shared map; this way it becomes possible to identify overlapping 
and separated areas of their argumentations. My fiction concludes with a third step in 
which the opponents criticize the other’s argument map, respectively. For that, I will 
propose only a few considerations that are based on my own understanding of the 
reconstructed positions. This way, I hope to illuminate some of the limitations of both 
authors’ bounding and framing of the contentious issue in question. In a concrete case, 
the process of finding a possible agreement would be based on further steps of defending 
objections, refining positions, and—hopefully—changing basic assumptions and claims. 
 The broader horizon of both articles is, roughly, the question how the 
international community should deal with Hamas. I do not have any intention to decide 
who is right and who is wrong in this controversy, and I am not interested to reflect any 
further considerations that should be discussed to decide this question, or to get a more 
appropriate picture of the problem—although it should be clear, based on my argument 
above, that I cannot exclude being biased myself either. The selection of both articles is 
more or less arbitrary; I found them by searching the most recent publications on Hamas 
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(March 2007) that are listed in the “Web of Science” database that provides web access to 
three ISI databases: Science Citation Index Expanded, Social Sciences Citation Index, 
and Arts & Humanities Search. Based on the selection criteria of these databases and the 
journals they cover, the scientific quality of both articles shouldn’t be a concern. 
 As I said earlier, Hamas won the Palestinian elections on January 25, 2006. 
Shortly after that, in the March-April issue of Foreign Affairs, Michael Herzog published 
an article titled “Can Hamas be tamed?” (Herzog, 2006). A short biographical info at the 
end of the article describes the author as  
 
a Brigadier General in the Israel Defense Forces and a Visiting Fellow at the Washington Institute 
for Near East Policy. He was formerly the senior military aide to Israel’s Minister of Defense and 
the head of strategic planning for the IDF. (Herzog, 2006) 
 
The second article I am going to discuss has been published by Khaled Hroub a few 
months later in the summer 2006 issue of Journal of Palestine Studies under the heading 
“A ‘new Hamas’ through its new documents” (Hroub, 2006). As a short note says, 
Khaled Hroub, “a leading expert on Hamas, is the author of Hamas: Political Thought 
and Practice (IPS, 2000) and Hamas: A Beginner’s Guide (forthcoming from Pluto Press, 
2006)” (Hroub, 2006, p. 6). 
 A step-by-step description of how arguments are to be developed by means of 
Logical Argument Mapping is available on the web (Hoffmann, 2007). This description 
includes a presentation of LAM’s notation; possible argument forms; a list of evaluation 
criteria that describe the minimal requirements of a logically valid, consistent, and 
complete (as far as possible) argumentation; and a list of links to examples on the web. In 
the limited space available here, I can only present some possible outcomes of the 
procedure. It should be sufficient to note that I treat each of the articles as one 
“argumentation” that is formed by one (Hroub) or more (Herzog) central “argument(s)” 
and additional considerations. These additions do either support parts of the argument(s), 
or they discuss possible objections to those parts. 
 An “argument” within such an “argumentation” is easily identifiable. First, it 
includes at least three elements—linked by arrows combined by the word “therefore”—
that are mapped in different text boxes: a claim, i.e. the conclusion of the argument; at 
least one reason for this claim; and what Toulmin (2003 <1958>) called a “warrant,” that 
is a statement whose function is to justify the relation between reason and claim and 
which, therefore, includes in itself a combination of reason and claim (in my modus 
ponens example mentioned in the last section, “B” would be the claim, “A” the reason, 
and “If A, then B” the warrant). The second characteristic of an “argument” is that the 
necessary warrant is written in an oval-shaped text box while all the other elements of an 
argumentation are written in rectangles. The reason for highlighting the warrant in this 
way is its special character. As a universal, law-like statement, it can be refuted by one 
counterexample. A general rule like “If A, then B,” for instance, is obviously false when 
we can name one case in which both “A” and the negation of “B” are true. Thus, the 
general rule “If it is raining, then the crops on the field will get wet” is refuted if you can 
show only one example where it rained, but the crops remained dry. The fact that 
warrants are so sensitive to objections is exactly what I need to induce changes in 
people’s thinking processes. You have to realize that the validity of the arguments you 
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are so convinced of after years and years of repeating them often depends on assumptions 
that are—looking at them in the bright light of an argument map—hard to defend. 
 I am treating here each of the articles as one “argumentation”; that means, they 
are reconstructed in one “map,” respectively. (All maps are created by means of Cmap, a 
freely available “knowledge modeling kit” that has been developed by the Institute for 
Human and Machine Cognition, IHMC, a not-for-profit research institute of the Florida 
University System: http://cmap.ihmc.us/). However, since these maps need a lot of space, 
I can present in this paper only the central parts of them; much of the information the 
authors are providing to support their main points, and their discussions of objections, are 
printed here independently as quotes, not as parts of the maps. The complete maps are 
available via a link in Hoffmann (2007), or directly through the following link: 
http://cmapspublic2.ihmc.us/servlet/SBReadResourceServlet?rid=1175354427380_67361
4899_4820&partName=htmltext. 
 Let me start with what I would reconstruct as the central argument of Herzog 
(2006; Figure 1). 
 
 
Figure 1: The central argument of Herzog (2006); all maps are created with IHMC 
Cmap tools: http://cmap.ihmc.us/) 
 
As support for his “reason” (right corner), Herzog adds two points: Hamas’ 
 
ideology was set forth in its 1988 covenant, which remains operative to this day. The covenant 
defines Palestinian nationalism and the conflict with Israel in religious terms: the land of Palestine 
“from the river to the sea” is considered an Islamic waqf, an “endowment,” and so no Muslim has 
the right to cede any part of it. The covenant explicitly calls for the obliteration of the state of 
Israel through the power of the sword and portrays the Jews as the source of all evil in the world. 
Freemasons, Rotarians, and members of organizations similar to theirs are denounced as Zionist 
agents, and they too are threatened with obliteration. The covenant stipulates that peace between 
Muslims, Christians, and Jews should only be permitted “under the wing of Islam.” 
 
the group fields a private army, embraces violence as a political tool, regularly orchestrates 
terrorist attacks, and is dedicated to the destruction of Israel and the establishment of an Islamist 
state ruling the territory of Israel and the PA (=Palestinian Autonomy). [The group's “operational” 
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wing] oversees hundreds of militants devoted to armed struggle against Israel and is in the process 
of building a backup militia of several thousand. It has been responsible for countless acts of 
terror—from abductions and murders to suicide bombings and rocket attacks—which have killed 
hundreds of Israelis, most of them civilians. 
 
Herzog assumes that what I reconstruct in Figure 1 as his “warrant” might be attacked. At 
least, he formulates a consideration that can be interpreted as a possible objection against 
this warrant, and then he refutes this objections. This way, that is by defending his 
argument against possible objections, he makes it stronger (Figure 2; note the overlap of 
both figures: in the complete map, the objection of Figure 2 is linked to the warrant in 
Figure 1). 
 The “comparative analysis” he mentions in the rebuttal of his objection (left 
corner at the bottom of Figure 2) forms the main part of his article. Herzog focuses 
especially on analogies that  
 
can be found in the modern history of the Muslim Middle East, with its assortment of relatively 
young independent states—nations where there is no democratic tradition or culture and where the 
governments have been challenged by Islamist movements advocating for the imposition of sharia 
while brandishing swords. 
 
The main points can be summarized as follows: 
 
• “In Turkey, the Islamists have been co-opted successfully,” but this success is 
based on “a secular public culture for more than eight decades and democratic 
institutions for more than five.” Additionally, state and military “has set clear 
limits on political behavior.” 
• “Jordan presents a model of successful Islamist co-optation (although less so of 
democracy),” but this is based on political integration of Islamists over six 
decades and the fact that their political wing occupies only “an average of a third 
of the seats in parliament.” 
• In Egypt political integration of Islamist moderates was possible only after they 
separated from radicals, based on decades of “repression and political exclusion.” 
• Lebanon’s Hezbollah “maintains the most powerful militia in the country, with 
control of a virtually autonomous area in southern Lebanon and a global terrorist 
reach that has often served Iranian purposes. ... Joining the government did not 
prevent Hezbollah from undertaking a serious cross-border attack on Israel in late 
November 2005, nor has its ideological platform or political demeanor shown 
signs of moderation.” 
 
For Herzog, his “comparative analysis” leads to what he calls “the most important 
lesson.” 
 
THE MOST important lesson to be drawn from these cases is that co-optation through political 
participation is not a given, but rather depends on the existence of certain conditions in the local 
political context. No Islamist movement has renounced violence or moderated its ideology of its 
own volition; when one has done so at all, it has been for lack of a better alternative. It appears 
that at least three factors need to be present for co-optation to occur: the existence of a strong, 
healthy, and relatively free political system into which the Islamists can be absorbed; a balance of 
power tilted against the Islamists that forces them to play by moderate rules; and sufficient time 
for co-optation to take effect. (Herzog, 2006) 
15 
MICHAEL H.G. HOFFMANN 
 
 
Figure 2: Herzog (2006) formulates a possible objection against the warrant (in 
turquoise), supports this objection by further information, and then rejects both the 




HAMAS AND LOGICAL ARGUMENT MAPPING 
Since the first two sentences of this “lesson” are presented in the form of universal 
statements, they can be interpreted as warrants, or as one warrant. Looking at what seems 
to be Herzog’s main goal—to provide an argument for what is quoted in the middle text 
box at the bottom of the following Figure 3—I would reconstruct the structure of 
conclusions he draws from this “most important lesson” as described in Figure 3. 
Based on this reconstruction, Herzog’s final position is formulated in the claim at 
the bottom of the map. The international community should develop pressure to generate 
the conditions under which, according to Herzog, “Hamas may liberalize.”  
After this reconstruction of the argumentation that Michael Herzog (2006) 
developed in “Can Hamas Be Tamed?,” let us have a look now at “A ‘New Hamas’ 
Through its New Documents” by Khaled Hroub (2006). Figure 4 presents the center of 
his argument, although the largest part of his article discusses the “new documents” that 
are mentioned in his “reason” (right corner at the top of Figure 4). 
Hroub analyzes three “new” Hamas documents and observes a development of 
Hamas’ position even among these documents that were published between fall 2005 and 
March 2006. While the first one still contains some problematic issues, both the later 
ones seem to fully support Hroub’s main point since he discusses possible problems only 
with regard to the first document. This discussion can again be “mapped” (Figure 5). 
The second document Hroub analyzes is the “draft National Unity Government 
program” as it has been proposed “to other Palestinian factions in March 2006 by a 
victorious Hamas as a basis for a coalition cabinet” (Hroub, 2006, p. 7). Without going 
into all the details that Hroub elaborates, his main points can be summarized as follows: 
• articles 9 and 10 “attempt to provide assurances that the Hamas-led government 
will function within the international conventions and agreements on Palestine” 
(p. 17). These articles “represent a major shift on Hamas’s part, showing an 
obvious attempt to maintain a delicate balance between appeasing international 
observers and Hamas’s own constituency” (p. 17). 
• “the program contains vestiges of the traditional policy of ‘stages’ whereby a 
Palestinian state in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip is seen as the first phase to 
liberate the entire land of Palestine” (p. 17). 
• “taken as a whole, the thrust of these articles—and the entire document—hovers 
around the concept of the two-state solution without a hint of the ‘liberation of the 
entire land of Palestine’ or ‘the destruction of Israel’ found in the charter [of 
1988].” 
• hints that “show at least implicit recognition of the legitimacy of international law 
and mechanisms” (p.17). 
• “As was the case with the electoral platform, ‘reform’ constitutes a major theme 
in the proposed national unity document” (p.18; he lists examples) 
• “The national unity platform contains almost no religious references, and those 
that do exist seem primarily linked to support for the national cause” (p.19). 
The third document is the “cabinet platform delivered by Prime Minister–elect Ismail 
Haniyeh on 27 March 2006 in a speech before the newly elected parliament. What makes 
the platform especially interesting is that it represents Hamas alone, having been drafted 
after the collapse of the national unity negotiations when there was no longer any need to 
make concessions to the factions” (p.19). Again, Hroub’s central points can be 
summarized as follows: 
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Figure 3: Herzog’s refinement and extension of his central argument (cf. Figure 1). The 
warrant at the top (oval box) is what he calls “the most important lesson” that he draws 
from his detailed “comparative analysis” that is mentioned in Figure 2. 
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Figure 4: The argument of Hroub (2006), including an implication of his conclusion that 
would be relevant for the question how Hamas should be treated by the international 
community (the lower left side box). Also, there is one possible objection against the 
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Figure 5: Hroub’s discussion of references to violence and Islam in Hamas’ 2005 
“Electoral Platform for Change and Reform.” In the complete map, this part of his 
argumentation supports the “reason” in Figure 4 (top right corner)  
 
 
• The document seeks “to address diverse audiences and to convey various 
messages, not always easy to reconcile. It sought to reassure the wider Palestinian 
public that their interests were the supreme preoccupation of the government and 
to convey to Fatah and the other electoral losers its desire to work together. It 
sought to signal to Israel its nonbelligerency and expectation of smooth 
interaction in ‘necessary contacts in all mundane affairs,’ even while emphasizing 
Palestinian suffering from Israeli policies and the Palestinians’ legitimate right to 
resist the occupation. It sought to overcome or temper the alarm in the West 
caused by its victory, emphasizing its commitment to responsible governance and 
to agendas long promoted by the international community. It sought to portray 
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itself to the neighboring skeptical Arab regimes, which feared the ramifications of 
a Hamas victory on their domestic affairs, as a responsible, trustworthy, and 
moderate government. At the same time, it had to live up to its promises and the 
expectations of its own constituency, and to reassure other Islamist movements 
and exponents of political Islam in the Middle East and beyond that the Hamas in 
power would be the same as the Hamas they had always known.” (p. 19 f.) 
• Haniyeh emphasizes: “ ‘We are committed to settling our differences in political 
positions and policies through dialogue, cooperation, and continuous coordination 
between the presidency and the other national institutions’.” (p. 20) 
• “Despite the refusal to formally recognize the PLO-Israel agreements or 
international resolutions on Palestine, the concept of the two-state solution is 
everywhere between the lines in Haniyeh’s speech, including in his insistence ‘on 
the Palestinian geographical unity and the need to link the two halves (West Bank 
and Gaza) of the homeland politically, economically, socially, and culturally. 
Parallel to this, we also emphasize the importance of linking the Palestinian 
people at home and in the diaspora.’ The reference to the West Bank and Gaza as 
the ‘two halves,’ with no reference to the ‘rest of the homeland’ in between (i.e., 
Israel proper) is highly significant” (p. 22). 
• “As in the case of the electoral platform and the national unity program already 
discussed, there is not the slightest hint of an intention to destroy Israel. Indeed, 
the speech could be said to represent an advance over the other two in this regard 
in that there is no reference to either ‘armed struggle’ (as in the preamble of the 
electoral platform) or ‘the current phase’ (as in article 5 of the national unity 
platform)” (p. 22). 
• “the core of Haniyeh’s speech was his government’s program” (p. 23, with 
examples). 
• “emphasizing good governance, matters of social justice, various aspects of 
economic and administrative reform, the rule of law, and the judiciary” (p. 23). 
• additionally, “the notion of citizenship was developed. ... ‘The government also 
undertakes to protect the rights of every citizen and to firmly establish the 
principle of citizenship without any discrimination on the basis of creed, belief or 
religion, or political affiliation’.” (p. 23) 
• new emphasis on economical questions in terms of “free-market thinking” (p. 24). 
 
6. BOUNDARY SETTING AND COMMON GROUND 
 
After this reconstruction of the arguments by Herzog and Hroub, we can compare now 
how both authors draw the boundaries around the problem in question. For that it is 
sufficient to put together the ideas they are referring to without reflecting their relations 
and connections. Based on the information and considerations the authors provide to 
support their reasons, and based on the considerations they derive from these reasons, we 
can collect all the items that are within the boundaries of their own, individual attention, 
respectively (Figure 6). 
In a fictitious dialogue whose goal was to overcome the disagreements between 
the authors, a visualization like Figure 6 could be used to challenge each of them to 
defend his own boundary setting, and to confront him with the perspective of the other. It 
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is important to make the mutual mechanisms of inclusion and exclusion visible. This 
way, it becomes obvious that, on the one hand, Herzog has to react to the new documents 
of Hroub’s analysis and, on the other, that Hroub has to react to the facts regarding 
Hamas’ activities which Herzog lists. It is neither sufficient to refer exclusively to the 
charter of 1988 and recent violence, nor exclusively to the signs of hope that become 
visible in the most recent documents. 
 
 
Figure 6: How Herzog and Hroub draw the boundaries around the Hamas issue, in 
reduced form 
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What becomes additionally visible in Figure 6 is something like a “common 
ground” on which further communication between Herzog and Hroub could be based. 
These are the issues both authors mention in their argumentation. However, it is 
important to note that each of them would frame these issues in a radical different way. 
For both is clear that Hamas is an Islamic Party, but does this mean that Hamas is 
“dedicated” to establish an Islamic state on what is now Israel (Herzog), or must this fact 
be counterbalanced by the “progressive de-emphasis on Islam” (p. 26) that Hroub tries to 
demonstrate? Both refer to Hamas’ 1988 charter, or covenant, but does this document 
remain “operative to this day” (Herzog), or must it be seen in the historical context in 
which it has been produced (Hroub)? And so on. 
A debate, however, on how these “shared” issues should be framed will probably 
not change much. Rather, it seems to be more likely that the processes of boundary 
setting and framing would simply be repeated with regard to each issue the parties focus 
on. Since any point of a controversial issue can be framed and bounded by means of 
different belief-value-attitude systems in different ways, parties to a conflict could move 
around forever without changing anything within their systems of beliefs, values, and 
attitudes. 
 
7. REVEALING THE BASICS 
 
At this point, however, Logical Argument Mapping has to offer something different. In 
the maps that represent the main arguments of Herzog (Figure 1 and 3) and Hroub 
(Figure 4), it is easy to see that the validity of these arguments depends on two different 
things: first, on the truth of the reasons provided and, second, on the truth of the warrant 
whose function is to justify the relation between reason and claim. That means, each of 
the authors is challenged either to convince his opponent of the truth of both these central 
elements of his argument, or to change the whole argument. 
 With regard to the reasons both provide, each of the authors could easily criticize 
his opponent by saying that his focus is too narrow. Each of them excludes exactly those 
data that are within the boundaries of his opponent, but not his own (see Figure 6). But 
while a discussion about what has to be included as significant and what can be excluded 
might lead to just those boundary and framing fights that can endlessly be continued 
without any result, defending the warrants leads directly to the heart of an argument.  
 Hroub, for example, realizes for himself that his central warrant could easily be 
rejected. According to my reconstruction in Figure 4 (oval text box), this warrant says: 
 
If recent documents show a new emphasis on state building, “little inclination to radical 
positions,” and downplaying of religious “overtones,” then there has been “an evolution in 
Hamas’s political thinking toward pragmatism and the Palestinian ‘mainstream’.” (Hroub, 2006, p. 
25) 
 
Reflecting on the adequacy of this warrant, he refers to skeptics who would argue against 
it by “suspecting a ploy” by Hamas “to gain power by concealing true agendas” (p.26). 
He admits that this might be possible: 
 
But it is equally true that the ‘new’ discourse of diluted religious content—to say nothing of the 
movement’s increasing pragmatism and flexibility in the political domain—reflects genuine and 
cumulative changes within Hamas. (p. 27) 
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However, Herzog could argue at this point that Hroub’s rebuttal of the skeptics’ objection 
does not provide any new information beyond what Hroub already presented to support 
his main reason. The supporting documents themselves, however, can in no way exclude 
the possibility that their authors tried to hide their “true” intentions. At the end, Hroub 
would have to admit that he cannot completely exclude this possibility. And that means, 
his warrant is not really strong enough to justify his conclusion. 
 An analysis of Herzog’s warrants, on the other side, reveals similar problems. 
First of all, using historic “lessons” to justify an universal statement like “No Islamist 
movement has renounced violence or moderated its ideology of its own volition” (oval 
text box on the top of Figure 3) is an inductive inference. Induction, however, is not a 
valid argument form. Even if the conclusion might be highly probable, there is always the 
possibility that something different happens. Hroub might also criticize at this point that 
the claim that Islamic movements change only based on pressure sounds hardly 
convincing. There may be many alternative explanations for those developments of 
Islamic movements which Herzog discusses in his article. Also, while Herzog highlights 
for example with regard to Egypt that “Decades of repression and political exclusion 
eventually split the [Muslim Brotherhood] into two branches,” with the “moderates” 
moving “toward the mainstream” and renouncing the “use of violence in 1971,” while the 
“radicals found their way into Egyptian Islamic Jihad and ultimately al Qaeda,” it might 
well be argued that the radicalization of the one branch is caused by exactly the same 
“repression” that caused supposedly the pacification of the other. And against the warrant 
that I derived in Figure 3 from Herzog’s “most important lesson,” that only pressure 
motivates “an Islamic movement to renounce violence and to moderate its ideology,” 
Hroub might well argue: Why pressing a development that is already under its way? 
At the end, the opponents could realize that the whole debate sounds a bit like the 
debate whether the chicken or the egg was first. Do we need a changed Hamas before we 





Against Fogelin’s pessimistic assumption that we have to live with the fact that there are 
“deep disagreements” which cannot be subject to rational resolution, I developed in this 
paper a pragmatic approach by proposing a tool—Logical Argument Mapping (LAM)—
that can be used to deal with any kind of disagreement and conflict as long as opponents 
are both ready to talk to each other and seriously interested to overcoming their 
difficulties in a peaceful way. LAM is based on the idea that the cognitive mechanisms 
that hinder mutual understanding must be visualized in order to change them. 
Challenging the parties to a conflict not only to provide reasons for their claims, but also 
to justify the assumption that those reasons are strong enough to support their claims, 
reveals how they define the boundaries around the issue in question, how they frame what 
is relevant for them, and how they make sense of any information and event, with which 
they are confronted. 
 Logical Argument Mapping is a visualization tool whose main function is to 
stimulate self-reflexivity and self-criticism. We have to see why we are thinking the way 
we are thinking in order to change—at least sometimes—the basic assumptions that form, 
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mostly implicitly and unconsciously, those systems of beliefs, values, and attitudes that 
are responsible for how we bound and frame the things we are facing. 
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